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I. INTRODUCTION
There is widespread discontent about the Supreme Court these days in certain
quarters. Scholars complain, as they often do, about the outcomes of Supreme Court
cases. But scholarly unhappiness transcends mere disagreement on the merits. Many
authors claim that the current Supreme Court has arrogated power to itself, and that it
lacks the proper respect for the coordinate branches.' The loudest clamor in this regard
relates to the Court's recent federalism decisions, but other areas receive similar
treatment.
At the heart of this criticism is the premise that the Supreme Court is interfering
with congressional preferences. 2 Superficially, one can see the logic in this. It has
t Copyright 2002 Barry Friedman and Anna Harvey. All rights reserved. The authors would
like to thank Melissa Aoyagi and Parvin Moyne for excellent research assistance, and Lisa
Mihajlovic for preparing the manuscript.
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1990, Princeton University; Ph.D. 1995, Princeton University.
1. Jack M. Balkin & Sanford Levinson, Understanding the Constitutional Revolution, 87 VA.
L. REV. 1045, 1106 (2001) ("[Tlhe current Supreme Court majority has been altogether too
disrespectful of democratic processes,. . . their political values are badly skewed, and.., their
invocations of text and original intention are opportunistic, ideologically biased, and self-
serving."); Laura S. Fitzgerald, Beyond Marbury: Jurisdictional Self-Dealing in Seminole Indian
Tribe, 52 VAND. L. REV. 407 passim (1999) (discussing the Court's recent decisions stripping
Congress of the power to abrogate state sovereign immunity and arrogating that power to itself);
Laura S. Fitzgerald, Is Jurisdiction Jurisdictional?, 95 Nw. U. L. REV. 1207, 1273-78 (2001)
(arguing that the Supreme Court has softened jurisdictional requirements to increase its own
power while enforcing strict restrictions on Congress's jurisdiction to act, raising serious
separation of powers concerns); Richard D. Friedman, Trying to Make Peace with Bush v. Gore,
29 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 811, 814 (2001) (arguing that Bush v. Gore was "an unnecessary and anti-
democratic arrogation of power"); Larry D. Kramer, The Supreme Court, 2000 Term-
Foreword: We the Court, 115 HARV. L. REv. 4, 14 (2001) ("[T]his Court sees no need to
accommodate the political branches at all.").
2. See, e.g., Stephen M. Griffin, Judicial Supremacy and Equal Protection in a Democracy of
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escaped no one's notice that in the last few years the Supreme Court has been
unusually aggressive in striking down congressional enactments. On the face of it, it
appears that at no time since the New Deal has conflict between the Court and the
Congress been as strong as it is today.
Based on this premise of Court-Congress conflict, scholarly commentary offers
solutions as to how Congress can regain the upper hand. Some authors suggest that
Congress compile fuller legislative records to meet increasingly strict Supreme Court
tests,5 or they chastise the legislative record requirements being imposed on the
Congress. 6 Other scholars actually propose stronger action to get the Court's attention.
7
Suggestions in print range from simply holding hearings, 8 to imposing a supermajority
requirement before the Justices can strike a congressional statute.9 At least two major
conferences (this Symposium being one of them) have been held to ask the precise
question: what should Congress do about the Supreme Court? 0
Rights, 4 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 281 (2002) (arguing that in the past twenty years the Court has
acted to limit the constitutional rights of minorities despite repeated attempts by Congress to
expand the rights protected under the Fourteenth Amendment); Kramer, supra note 1, at 14
(arguing that the Rehnquist Court "increasingly ignores or affirmatively denies legitimacy to the
views of other actors").
3. See, e.g., Barry Friedman, The History of the Countermajoritarian Difficulty, Part Three:
The Lesson of Lochner, 76 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1383 (2001) (noting Supreme Court's recent cases
limiting Congress's regulatory power); Griffin, supra note 2, at 301-13 (describing Rehnquist
Court's invalidation of Congress's expansive civil rights legislation).
4. Balkin & Levinson, supra note 1, at 1058-59.
5. Robert C. Post & Reva B. Siegel, Protecting the Constitution from the People: Juricentric
Restrictions on Section Five Power, 78 IND. L.J. 1 (2003).
6. Cf William W. Buzbee & Robert A. Schapiro, Legislative Record Review, 54 STAN. L.
REV. 87 (2001) (arguing that the Rehnquist Court's embrace of legislative record review
imposes illegitimate constraints on legislative action, and suggesting ways in which Congress
can develop records to survive such review).
7. See, e.g., Kramer, supra note 1, at 157-169 ("If the problem really is Congress's failure to
take the Constitution seriously enough, the solution is to put our energies into rejuvenating and
improving the legislature's capacity in this regard, not to hand the matter over to a bunch of
judges."); Robert C. Post & Reva B. Siegel, Equal Protection by Law: Federal
Antidiscrimination Legislation After Morrison and Kimel, 110 YALE L.J. 441, 444 (2000); see
also Barry Friedman, The Birth of an American Obsession: The History of the
Countermajoritarian Difficulty, Part Five, 112 YALE L.J. 153, 155 (2002) (describing "a spate of
articles decrying the inconsistency of democracy with judicial review, and calling for
constitutional interpretation outside the courts").
8. Philip P. Frickey, The Fool on the Hill: Congressional Findings, Constitutional
Adjudication, and United States v. Lopez, 46 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 695, 720 (1996) ("[A]
prudent Congress might wish to follow the Rome model when exercising its commerce power:
articulate the judicial standard (the subject of the statute must have a substantial effect upon
interstate commerce) and then document the satisfaction of that standard through facts developed
in hearings and other legislative methods."); Post & Siegel, supra note 5, at 15-16.
9. Evan Caminker, Thayerian Deference to Congress and Supreme Court Supermajority
Rule, 78 IND. L.J. 73 (2003).
10. Equal Justice Society, The Assault of Federalism on Civil Rights: Developing New
Strategies to Protect Civil Rights in a Conservative Era, Conference at Harvard Law School
(Apr. 5-6, 2002).
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This Article challenges the notion that Congress wants to do anything about the
Supreme Court. The premise of this Article is that the seeming tension between the
Congress and the Court rests on a misconception, to wit: because the Court is striking
down congressional statutes, Congress disagrees with what the Court is doing. Despite
superficial appeal, the argument here is that the premise is incorrect.
This Congress is not discontent with the Supreme Court, we hypothesize, because it
does not disagree on the merits with what the Court is doing. Indeed, we contend that,
if anything, the fact that the Court at present is unusually active in striking
congressional statutes could be a clear signal that the Court faces an ideologically
congenial sitting Congress." A Supreme Court facing an ideologically distant sitting
Congress has several reasons to defer to congressional preferences, even in
constitutional cases.' 2 But a Supreme Court that faces an ideologically congenial
Congress has more freedom to strike statutes enacted by past Congresses. In short, the
current Congress may not at all be displeased with the sitting Court.
This Article employs empirical analysis to explore the relationship between the
ideological distance between Congress and the Court, and the Court's propensity to
strike congressional statutes. We examine two kinds of ideological distance: that
between the Court and the enacting Congress, and that between the Court and the
sitting Congress. We find that, while some might expect the Court to be more likely to
overturn statutes from ideologically distant enacting Congresses, there is no evidence
of this effect in the data we employ. However, we do find that the Court is quite
sensitive to the ideological composition of the sitting Congress: the closer the
Congress, the more likely it is that the Court will overturn congressional statutes.
We focus here on the work of the Rehnquist Court. That Court has been notoriously
conservative throughout its history. Yet, the Rehnquist Court began actively
invalidating congressional statutes only after a conservative Congress was elected in
1994. In other words, even though a Court disposed to strike liberal congressional
enactments was in place since 1986, it was not until the Court had allies elsewhere in
the federal government that it began systematically to strike statutes enacted by past
Congresses. Our data suggest that this coincidence of events may not, in fact, be
coincidental.
If we are correct, then those who are looking for a remedy for the Supreme Court's
current behavior are looking in the wrong direction. Rather than asking what Congress
can do about the Supreme Court, the question scholars unhappy with the Supreme
Court should be asking is: how can we get a Congress that will disagree with the
Court? Our data suggest that the Court is sensitive to the ideological composition of
the sitting Congress. We talk of "electing" the Supreme Court, because our hypothesis
is that if a more liberal Congress were in place, the Court would be less aggressive in
its conservative decisionmaking. Thus, if scholars are concerned about the ideological
direction of the Supreme Court, perhaps they should focus on electoral politics.
This Article has three parts. First, we provide a sketch of the theory animating our
project. Second, we discuss the methodology we adopted to test our hypothesis that
11. Cf Frank B. Cross & Blake J. Nelson, Strategic Institutional Effects on Supreme Court
Decisionmaking, 95 Nw. U. L. REv. 1437, 1457-58 (2001) (suggesting that if Congress is
overriding the Court in statutory cases, it means the Court does not feel constrained, because if it
did feel constrained then Congress would not need to override its decisions).
12. See infra notes 17-18 and accompanying text.
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politics plays a role in the Supreme Court's willingness to strike down acts of
Congress. Third, we present our results.
I1. THEORY
The claim that the Supreme Court's response to congressional statutes might be
determined at least partially by ideology is not a new one. Among political scientists,
"attitudinalists" have long claimed that Supreme Court Justices have preferences over
case outcomes that are not simply the result of the process of legal reasoning. Rather,
attitudinalists suggest, Justices have "ideological" preferences that motivate their
decisions.' 3 Given the premise of ideologically motivated Justices, it is not a large leap
to suppose that when the Court and an enacting Congress are ideologically "close," the
Court should be less inclined to strike statutes enacted by that Congress than when the
two institutions are ideologically distant. By the attitudinalist account, we should
expect conflict between the Court and an enacting Congress (as measured, for
example, by the frequency with which legislation from that Congress is overruled) to
be an increasing function of the ideological distance between the two institutions.
The claims of attitudinalists have been challenged in the realm of statutory cases, on
the ground that the Court in those cases is really engaged in a strategic interaction with
the political branches. In other words, it is notjust the ideological distance between the
court and the enacting Congress that matters. Rather, in statutory interpretation cases,
the ideological distance between the Court and the sitting Congress plays a role as
well. 14 This is because if a sitting Congress does not agree with the Court's
interpretation of a particular statute, it can reenact that statute while making clear its
own interpretation. In statutory cases, many thus contend the Court will be constrained
by ideologically distant sitting Congresses from acting on its own ideological
preferences alone. 15 The expectation of conflict between the Court and an enacting
Congress in statutory cases, then, may be affected by the ideological distance between
the Court and the sitting Congress: the larger this distance, the more likely it is that the
Court will temper its interpretation of legislation from more distant enacting
Congresses (and vice versa).
13. JEFFREY A. SEGAL & HAROLD J. SPAETH, THE SUPREME COURT AND THE ATTITUDINAL
MODEL (1993); JEFFREY A. SEGAL & HAROLD J. SPAETH, THE SUPREME COURT AND THE
ATTITUDINAL MODEL REVISITED (2002); Jeffrey A. Segal, Separation of Powers Games in the
Positive Theory of Congress and Courts, 91 AM. POL. Sci. REv. 28 (1997).
14. Political scientists have long supposed that members of Congress may be characterized as
possessing relatively well-defined (if electorally induced) ideological preferences as well. KEITH
T. POOLE & HOWARD ROSENTHAL, CONGRESS: A POLITICAL-ECONOMIC HISTORY OF ROLL CALL
VOTING (1997); Keith T. Poole, Recovering a Basic Space From a Set of Issue Scales, 42 AM. J.
POL. SCI. 954 (1998).
15. See, e.g., William N. Eskridge, Jr., Overriding Supreme Court Statutory Interpretive
Decisions, 101 YALE L.J. 331 (1991); John A. Ferejohn & Barry R. Weingast, A Positive Theory
of Statutory Interpretation, 12 INT'L REv. L. & ECON. 263 (1992); Rafael Gely & Pablo T.
Spiller, A Rational Choice Theory of Supreme Court Statutory Decisions with Applications to the
State Farm and Grove City Cases, 6 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 2 (1990); Pablo T. Spiller & Rafael
Gely, Congressional Control or Judicial Independence: The Determinants of US. Supreme
Court Labor-Relations Decisions, 1949-1988, 23 RAND. J. ECON. 463 (1992).
[Vol. 78:123
ELECTING THE SUPREME COURT
Even if this strategic interaction is true in statutory cases, one might argue that in
constitutional cases the Court has no need to defer to the sitting Congress. It can
pursue its own ideological predilections without concern for the possible opposition of
the sitting Congress. After all, the only recourse of the political branches in
constitutional cases is the route of constitutional amendment, and we all know how
likely that is.' 6 The Court is therefore free to overturn statutes passed by enacting
Congresses with whom it disagrees on ideological or policy grounds.
This sharp distinction between constitutional and statutory cases is flawed,
however. As numerous commentators have observed, a sitting Congress is not without
recourse if constitutional decisions are problematic in its view. There are numerous
weapons a sitting Congress can apply against a Supreme Court deemed to be
recalcitrant, including jurisdiction stripping, budget cutting, Court packing, and even
the impeachment of Supreme Court Justices.17 It is true that none of these have been
utilized in many years, but the possibility is there, and members of Congress resort, on
occasion, to threatening the Court with such actions.18 Thus, there is reason to think
that the Court might alter its behavior in the face of the possibility of political
response.19 Just as in statutory cases, then, we would expect the likelihood of
constitutional conflict between the Court and an enacting Congress to be conditioned
on the ideological distance between the Court and the sitting Congress: the greater the
distance, the less likely is the Court to strike statutes from distant enacting Congresses
(and vice versa).2
16. Rafael Gely & Pablo T. Spiller, The Political Economy of Supreme Court Constitutional
Decisions: The Case of Roosevelt's Court-Packing Plan, 12 INT'L REV. L. & ECON. 45 (1992)
(arguing that Congress's only recourse to objectionable Supreme Court decisions in
constitutional cases is the amendment process); Pablo T. Spiller & Matthew L. Spitzer, Judicial
Choice of Legal Doctrines, 8 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 8 (1992) (arguing that factors other than
potential opposition from the political branches must explain the rarity of constitutional
overrulings by the Court). But see Lee Epstein et al., The Supreme Court as a Strategic National
Policymaker, 50 EMORY L.J. 583 (2001) (contending that the Court has incentives to respond to
congressional preferences even in constitutional cases).
17. GEOFFREY R. STONE ET AL., CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 72-77 (2d ed. 1991); Barry Friedman,
"Things Forgotten" in the Debate Over Judicial Independence, 14 GA. ST. U. L. REV. 737, 755,
758 n.97 (1998); McNollgast, Politics and Courts: A Positive Theory of Judicial Doctrine and
the Rule of Law, 68 S. CAL. L. REV. 1631 (1995); Gerald N. Rosenberg, Judicial Independence
and the Reality of Political Power, 54 REV. POL. 369, 376-77 (1992). For a discussion of these
many weapons in the context of statutory interaction, see Cross & Nelson, supra note 11, at
1460-71.
18. Andrew D. Martin, Statutory Battles and Constitutional Wars: Congress and the Supreme
Court (Oct. 26,2001) (unpublished manuscript, on file with author); TERRI JENNINGS PERETTI, IN
DEFENSE OF A POLITICAL COURT 145-46 (1999) (discussing "rule of anticipated reactions");
James A. Stimson et al., Dynamic Representation, 89 AM.. POL. Sci. REV. 543, 544-45 (1995)
(discussing the rational anticipation model).
19. Epstein et al., supra note 16; Martin, supra note 18.
20. There is another variable here, often overlooked in the political science literature, which
is whether the public-at-large is in agreement with the Court. Certainly public opinion has the
potential to influence the political branches to act-or not to act as the case may be. See Gely &
Spiller, supra note 16; cf Gregory A. Caldeira & James L. Gibson, The Etiology of Public
Supportfor the Supreme Court, 36 AM. J. POL. Sci. 635 (1992); Gregory A. Caldeira, Courts and
Public Opinion, in THE AMERICAN COURTS: A CRITICAL ASSESSMENT 303 (John B. Gates &
2003]
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There is one more important piece to this story: the fact that despite the recent
aggressiveness of the Supreme Court toward congressional legislation, and the clamor
in scholarly quarters, for the most part Congress has been quiescent. What motivated
us to begin our examination was the relative lack of concern we observe in
congressional quarters over the Court's binge in striking congressional statutes.21 Our
premise was that given all the actions Congress could take against the Court, the fact
that it was not taking those actions suggested congressional contentment with the
situation.
It is worth noting here that the historical record of what we know of congressional
behavior comports with our expectations. That is, history confirms the intuition that
the Court will find itself under congressional attack only when there is ideological
disagreement between the Court and Congress. Throughout history, there have been a
number of instances of congressional attacks on judicial institutions, particularly on the
Supreme Court and the power ofjudicial review.22 Each of these has been the product
of ideological distance between the Supreme Court and Congress. Sometimes the
distance resulted in Supreme Court decisions contrary to congressional preferences; at
other times, it was only anticipated disagreement that led to attacks on the courts. But
we can think of no time in which the Supreme Court was attacked when the branches
were aligned politically.
Classic is the case of the first major congressional attack on the judiciary, in the
period following the 1800 election.23 After Jeffersonian Republicans swept into power
in that election, the Congress threatened wide scale impeachment ofjudges, repealed a
critical piece of legislation that had increased judicial power, and the halls of Congress
rang with attacks on judicial independence. Notably, however, this was a time when
Charles A. Johnson eds., 1991); Kevin T. McGuire & James A. Stimson, The Least Dangerous
Branch Revisited: New Evidence on Supreme Court Responsiveness to Public Preferences (Apr.
27, 2000) (unpublished manuscript on file with Professor Barry Friedman). But here the claim
would have to be that the public was discontent with the Court, and in disagreement with elected
representatives. That is not an impossible state of affairs-indeed, it might be the case to a
certain extent at present, if in fact the population is more liberal than the executive or critical
veto gates in Congress on issues such as the constitutionality of the Violence Against Women
Act, or the need for remedies against state governments under the Age Discrimination in
Employment Act. However, two factors serve to diminish the likelihood that public pressure will
push the Congress to respond to the Court anytime soon. First, the Court's decisions have been
in complex areas like the Eleventh Amendment, which are difficult to translate into salience for
the general public. Second, it likely takes a groundswell of public opinion to motivate the elected
branches against the Court, especially when public opinion is contrary to the ideological beliefs
of those elected representatives.
21. See Mark Tushnet, Foreword: The Constitutional Order and the Chastening of
Constitutional Aspiration, 113 HARV. L. REv. 29, 78-79 (1999) ("[T]he Court is only now
confronting questions about the interpretation and constitutionality of statutes enacted during the
previous constitutional regime. From the new regime's perspective these statutes-even those
recently enacted-are outdated in the sense that they could not be enacted in the new regime.").
22. See generally Friedman, supra note 17.
23. Id. at 739-40 (describing Republican attack on Court after Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1
Cranch) 137 (1803)).
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the judiciary was the haven for recently disempowered Federalists. Even then,
accounts suggest the Republicans kept their hands off the Court until the Court
signaled it was an actual, and not just a potential, threat, by issuing its now-famous
show cause order in Marbury v. Madison.24
Events during Reconstruction were to similar effect. During that period the Court's
size was manipulated three times, and its jurisdiction was stripped at one critical
moment. The manipulations of size all had avowedly apolitical judicial reform
motives, but it has not escaped notice how they occurred at times when changes in the
composition of the Court were necessary to ensure that the Court's views were in
conformity with the Republican Congress (and especially not in conformity with the
despised Andrew Johnson). Similarly, jurisdiction stripping only occurred after the
Republican Congress determined that it faced a real threat that the Court might
invalidate its plans for Reconstruction of the South.25
The New Deal Court-packing plan follows the same model. The Court got into
trouble when Franklin Roosevelt and the New Deal Democrats swept the Congress in
1936. The Supreme Court in 1936 largely was a holdover Court, appointed by past
administrations. The Court was notably opposed to the New Deal agenda and
interfered with it repeatedly. Yet, only in the face of continued intransigence did
Roosevelt propose his plan to pack the Court.26
The last serious challenge to the Court occurred in 1957, and events here are a bit
murkier. 27 The Court found itself in the face of congressional controversy after it
handed down ten decisions during its Term-four on one day-upholding the rights of
Communists, accused Communists, and Communist sympathizers. However, it would
be naive to suggest that this was all that motivated Congress at the time. Anger at the
Court had been intense among Southern Democrats since the decision in Brown v.
Board of Education.2s Those Democrats were a powerful force in the 1950s Congress.
But it was only after the Court also appeared to take sides with the Communists that a
coalition was formed that could plausibly threaten the Court. The Congress sitting in
the spring of 1957 was a fairly conservative one, facing a Court handing down liberal
decisions, so it is no surprise that the Court was threatened by that Congress.
Part of what this history establishes is that congressional action against the Court is
rare. Many of the attempts described here came to naught. There are sound reasons of
political economy for this. Court disciplining typically requires at least congressional
action with approval by the President. There are numerous "veto gates" at which the
action could be stopped.
However, it is possible that the Court also anticipates when it is likely to get into
24. 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803).
25. See generally CHARLES WARREN, THE SUPREME COURT IN UNITED STATES HISTORY 455-
97 (rev. ed. 1937); Friedman, supra note 17, at 743-47; Charles G. Geyh, Judicial Independence,
Judicial Accountability, and the Role of Constitutional Norms in Congressional Regulation of
the Courts, 78 IND. L.J. 153 (2003); Keith E. Whittington, Reconstructing the Federal Judiciary:
The Chase Impeachment and the Constitution, 9 STUD. AM. POL. DEV. 55 (1995).
26. See generally Barry Friedman, The History of the Countermajoritarian Difficulty, Part
Four: Law's Politics, 148 U. PA. L. REv. 971 (2000).
27. Friedman, supra note 7, at 195.
28. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
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trouble and avoids the fray. Indeed, that is what might distinguish the Supreme Court
after 1937--or certainly 1957-from the Court before those dates. History has taught
the Court that the political branches will take action when the stakes are high enough.
The Justices have alluded, even in written opinions, to the events of 1937. Thus,
"anticipated reaction" might temper judicial activism in the face of a hostile
Congress.
29
Relying on the intuition that the Justices frame their behavior in response to
possible congressional threats, we examine whether there is any reason to think the
present Court faces danger in what appears to be repeated confrontation with
Congress. Our claim is this: there is no reason to talk about what Congress can do to
the Court, if there is no reason to think Congress wants to do anything. Taking
Rehnquist Court decisions as our fodder, we demonstrate that the Court's activist
impulse toward congressional statutes became noticeable only when an ideologically
favorable Congress took its seat. If we are correct in this, then this Symposium, and
others like it, may be asking the wrong question. Those discontent with the Court's
recent decisions should not spend their time asking what Congress can do. The
answers are familiar and available for an unhappy Congress. Rather, political activists
should spend their time working to elect a Congress sympathetic to their views, and
unsympathetic to the Supreme Court's current project. 30
III. METHODOLOGY
Our claim is that the Supreme Court is more likely to strike down congressional
statutes-particularly those of ideologically distant enacting Congresses-when it
faces an ideologically close sitting Congress. When the Court faces an ideologically
distant sitting Congress, it should be more likely to refrain from striking down
legislation for fear of congressional retaliation.
The hypothesis of an ideological but strategically self-restrained Court has been
tested in a variety of statutory settings and has found only mixed support. 1 It has also
been tested in a much more limited way for constitutional cases, and has again
received only tentative or no support. 2
29. PERETTI, supra note 18, at 145-46 (identifying "anticipated reaction" sources).
30. See Balkin & Levinson, supra note 1, at 1102:
According to our theory of partisan entrenchment, each party has the political
"right" to entrench its vision of the Constitution in the judiciary if it wins a
sufficient number of elections. If others don't like the constitutional vision that
results, they have the equal right to go out and win some elections of their own.
31. In the statutory context, strategic behavior manifests itself not in interpreting laws in a
way that will not be overruled by Congress. See Eskridge supra note 15; Ferejohn & Weingast,
supra note 15. While Spiller and Gely, supra note 15, found support for the strategically self-
restrained hypothesis in statutory cases involving labor relations cases between 1949 and 1988,
Segal and Cover found no such support in statutory civil liberties cases. Segal, supra note 13.
32. Epstein et al., supra note 16, provide descriptive evidence which appears to support the
proposition that moderate justices adjust their voting behavior in constitutional civil rights cases
to take account of the preferences of presidents and median senators, but Martin, supra note 18,
using a more sophisticated methodology, finds no such adjustment to congressional preferences
in the same cases. See also Richard L. Revesz, Congressional Influence on Judicial Behavior?
An Empirical Examination of Challenges to Agency Action in the D.C. Circuit, 76 N.Y.U. L.
[Vol. 78:123
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One problem common to all empirical testing to date of the hypothesis of a
strategically restrained Court has to do with the nature of the data used in these tests.
All empirical tests to date have used as their fodder the decisions of the Court in some
set of orally argued cases resulting in signed opinions. The problem with using
decisions in these cases (or some subset thereof) is that these cases may well be the
product of prior, strategic, decisions. If it is true that the Court will refrain from
striking congressional statutes when it faces a hostile Congress, then strategic litigants
seeking to have such statutes overturned may refrain from incurring the costs of
challenging those statutes as long as the Court and Congress are ideologically distant.
33
Even more likely, the Court may refrain from granting certiorari in such cases because
it can anticipate its own deferential response.34 Either or both of these processes could
bias the sample of orally argued cases against finding evidence of strategic self-
restraint in judicial decisionmaking.
One possible way to correct for this selection bias is to undertake what we call a
"statute-centered" test of the hypothesis of a strategically restrained Supreme Court.
That is, instead of using decisions in orally argued cases as our units of analysis, we
follow the fates of all individual statutes enacted in any given year. To make this
project manageable, we focus on the Rehnquist Court alone. The Rehnquist Court is a
good choice because it has been relatively stable ideologically, and has faced
Congresses of very different ideological compositions.
We examine the Rehnquist Court through the 1999 October Term, a period for
which we have complete data.35 We began tracking public laws enacted by the 100th
Congress, elected in 1986, and continued through all public laws enacted by the end of
the first year of the 106th Congress, elected in 1998.36 Table One contains the numbers
REv. 1100, 1104-05 (2001) (finding no effect of party change in Congress and President on
behavior of D.C. Circuit in environmental cases).
33. Kevin T. McGuire et al., Ambiguities in Measuring and Modeling the U.S. Supreme
Court, (Sept. 1999) (unpublished manuscript on file with Professor Barry Friedman); Revesz,
supra note 32, at 1117-19 (describing how litigant behavior can cause case selection bias in
samples).
34. LEE EPSTEIN & JACK KNIGHT, THE CHOICES JUSTICES MAKE 84 (1998); Cross & Nelson,
supra note 11, at 1476 ("A constrained Court might be limited in the decisions it makes but it
alternatively might merely be limited in the cases that it takes.").
35. Although we lack the data to formally study the 2000 and 2001 Court Terms, familiarity
with the Court's continued aggressive course suggests our results would be enhanced. See Fed.
Mar. Comm'n v. S.C. State Ports Auth., 122 S. Ct. 1864 (2002) (holding that sovereign
immunity barred federal commission from adjudicating complaint filed by private party against
state port agency for alleged violation of federal maritime law); Bd. of Trs. of Univ. of Ala. v.
Garrett, 121 S. Ct. 955 (2001) (striking down provision of the Americans with Disabilities Act
because Congress exceeded its powers under Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment); Kramer,
supra note 1.
36. Although it usually takes several years for a challenge to a statute to work its way to the
Supreme Court, it can happen quite quickly. See, e.g., Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 8 (1976)
(explaining that the challenged Act, the Federal Election Campaign Act, provided for
certification of constitutional questions to the en banc Circuit Court, and expedited review by
Circuit and Supreme Court, and thus Supreme Court heard the case within eleven months of
district court's decision). To account for this possibility we start following laws within a year of
enactment.
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of public laws enacted by each Congress, 37 and the number of years that the statutes
are followed for each group. 38 In total, we follow the fate of 3315 statutes for an
average of 7.6 years (with a range of one to thirteen years). An observation thus
consists of statute i observed in year t; we have 28,001 observations in all.
We are interested in whether and when these statutes were eventually struck down
by the Court. Our dependent variable is thus dichotomous: a statute survives unless
and until it is struck down by the Court. Statutes still "alive" are coded as 0; struck
statutes are coded as 1 in the term in which they are struck down, and are then
removed from the data set. In all, eighteen of the 3315 statutes were struck between
1987 and 1999.
We hypothesize that the probability that a statute is struck down in any given Court
term is a function of two variables: the ideological distance between the enacting
Congress and the Court (i.e., the attitudinal hypothesis), and the ideological distance
between the sitting Congress and the Court (i.e., the strategic hypothesis). 39 Our test
can provide indirect evidence of strategic self-restraint by the Court, recognizing that
direct evidence of such behavior is hard to come by. If we in fact find that the
probability that a congressional statute is overturned is responsive to the ideological
distance between the Court and the sitting Congress, then we will have evidence that
either the Court, or actors who anticipated the Court's likely actions, was/were
constrained by congressional preferences in constitutional cases.
We now turn to a discussion of our procedures for measuring our dependent and
independent variables, and for conducting our analyses.
A. Unconstitutional Statutes
Our study encompasses the congressional statutes enacted between 1987 and 1999
(inclusive of the beginning and ending years), which were reviewable by the Supreme
Court during the October Terms 1987-1999. Our first task was thus to determine which
of these statutes had been struck down by the Court during this period. While there are
a variety of sources that purport to provide this information in the form of lists of
congressional statutes struck down by the Court, the lists do not necessarily agree with
one another. In order to tackle this problem, we first combined several lists of cases
involving struck congressional statutes to come up with the most comprehensive list
possible.4 ° When the lists agreed with one another, we accepted that the case identified
37. 147 CONG. REC. D46 (2001); 145 CONG. REC. D29 (1999); 143 CONG. REc. Dl (1997); 140
CONG. REC. D690 (1994); 138 CONG. REc. D725 (1993); 136 CONG. REC. D804 (1991); 134
CONG. REC. D787 (1988).
38. The Congress also enacts an increasingly small number of private bills every legislative
session; these bills concern topics of very narrow interest to individual members. Private bills
are not included in our data set.
39. In order to allow each measure to have an independent impact on the outcome, we do not
combine these into a single variable.
40. Ultimately the three fullest sources were the following: (1) CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH
SERV., LIBRARY OF CONGRESS, THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA:
ANALYSIS AND INTERPRETATION-ANNOTATIONS OF CASES DECIDED BY THE SUPREME COURT OF
THE UNITED STATES TO JUNE 29, 1992, S. Doc. No. 103-6, at 2001-31 (Johnny H. Killian &
George A. Costello eds., 1996 & Supp. 2000) (listing acts of Congress that the Supreme Court
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by the various lists was one that struck down a congressional statute (although, as we
explain in a moment, there was further refinement beyond this point). When the lists
disagreed, we examined the relevant Supreme Court precedent to determine which of
the sources was correct.4
A difficult question was whether to focus only on instances in which the Supreme
Court actually invalidated a statute, or to be concerned with judicial construction that
rendered the statute inconsistent with its original meaning. After all, the Court
essentially can gut a statute without formally overruling it.42 However, it was
practically and jurisprudentially impossible to consider every judicial modification of a
statute in conducting our analysis. On the practical side, the number of statutes is too
great to permit us to research what the enacting Congress actually meant a statute to
be, and what the Court made of it. But to pose the practical question this way is to
underscore the futility of such an endeavor even if we had the resources. The very
nature of legal disagreement, especially among cases that work their way to the top of
the judicial system, is such that it is simply impossible to measure deviation between
what Congress originally intended and what the Court did, at least in many cases.
Finally, from the cases of congressional overruling we identified, we had to
determine the year in which the statute at issue was enacted. Despite its apparent
simplicity, there are a number of problems that complicate this task. The lists that
compile cases striking down statutes often indicate the year of the enactment
invalidated. When those sources agreed, we accepted their determination. But
disagreement was frequent, which likely is because of some thorny problems in
reaching this determination. Perhaps this also is why in its written decisions the
Supreme Court often does not identify the year of enactment of a statute it is
reviewing.
The biggest stumbling block to identifying year of enactment is that statutes are
frequently reenacted or updated, posing the question of which year is the relevant one.
We assume that if a Congress reenacts a statute, it is ideologically supportive of that
statute. Therefore we report and use the most recent plausible date of enactment. We
recognize that our assumption will not always be correct, as with the wholesale
reenactment or recodification of statutes. Yet, the reenactments we encountered were
has held unconstitutional in whole or in part); (2) Nicholas S. Zeppos, Deference to Political
Decisionmakers and the Preferred Scope of Judicial Review, 88 Nw. U. L. REv. 296, app. A at
335-45 (1993) (listing Supreme Court invalidations and interpretations of federal legislation
using constitutional norms, decided from 1939 to 1992); see also id. at 309-10 (discussing
methodology used to identify these cases); and (3) LEE EPSTEIN, THE SUPREME COURT
COMPENDIUM: DATA, DECISIONS, AND DEVELOPMENTS (3d ed. 2002). We found the criterion
used to determine overruling in the U.S. Supreme Court Database, compiled by Harold Spaeth,
far narrower than those used in the previous sources.
41. Compilers would, on occasion, include a case that struck down a state statute. E.g., Saenz
v. Roe, 526 U.S. 489 (1999) (involving the constitutionality of a California statute limiting the
maximum welfare benefits available to newly arrived residents), included in the SUPREME COURT
COMPENDIUM, see EPSTEIN, supra note 40. Compilers would also exclude cases that struck down
congressional statutes. E.g., United States v. Bajakajian, 524 U.S. 321 (1998) (involving a
challenge to a federal forfeiture statute on grounds that forfeiture would violate the Excessive
Fines Clause of the Eighth Amendment), excluded by the Library of Congress list. See
generallysupra note 38.
42. Zeppos, supra note 40, at 309-10.
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statute-specific enough that we felt comfortable holding to our supposition.
Somewhat trickier were amendments of statutes. If the amendment was the portion
of the statute struck down by the Court, there was no problem in identifIying the
relevant enacting Congress. If the amendment was not at the heart of the judicial
overruling, then it was necessary to determine whether the prior or later Congress
should be designated as the enacting Congress. Our determination of this issue
essentially asked: "Did the fact of amendment show support for (or suggest
disagreement with) the part of the statute later invalidated by the Supreme Court?" If
the fact of amendment showed support for the part of the statute later invalidated by
the Court, then we used the amending Congress as the enacting Congress. For
example, in Greater New Orleans Broadcasting Ass 'n v. United States, the Supreme
Court invalidated a congressional statute prohibiting advertisement of casinos. 43 That
statute was enacted in 1934.44 A 1988 amendment added the words "or television,"
thus including television broadcasting as a medium through which casino advertising
was prohibited.45 This amendment clearly signaled congressional support for the thrust
of the original statute, and thus we felt comfortable using the later Congress as the
enacting Congress.
Table Two reports the years in which, and the Congresses by which, the eighteen
struck statutes were enacted, as determined by the foregoing decision rules. Table Two
also reports the name of the statutes, as well as the years and cases in which they were
struck by the Court.
B. The Ideological Measures
Several measures of congressional and Supreme Court ideology exist. Perhaps the
most frequently used measure of congressional ideology, developed by Keith Poole
and Howard Rosenthal, estimates ideological "ideal points" for members of the House,
the Senate, and the Presidency in the same ideological "space" between 1937
and 1 999.46 Using a similar estimation methodology, Andrew Martin and Kevin Quinn
use Supreme Court Justices' votes on cases to estimate term-by-term ideological ideal
43.527 U.S. 173, 176 (1999) (holding, on First Amendment grounds, that 18 U.S.C. § 1304
and 47 CFR § 73.1211 (1998), may not be applied to "advertisements of private casino gambling
that are broadcast by radio or television stations located in Louisiana, where such gambling is
legal").
44. Communications Act of 1934, ch. 662, §316, 48 Stat. 1088.
45. 18 U.S.C. § 1304 (2000) reads:
Whoever broadcasts by means of any radio or television station for which a license
is required by any law of the United States, or whoever, operating any such station,
knowingly permits the broadcasting of, any advertisement of or information
concerning any lottery, gift enterprise, or similar scheme, offering prizes
dependent in whole or in part upon lot or chance, or any list of the prizes drawn or
awarded by means of any such lottery, gift enterprise, or scheme, whether said list
contains any part or all of such prizes, shall be fined under this title or imprisoned
not more than one year, or both.
The language is as amended in 1988, by Pub. L. No. 100-625, § 3(a)(4), and in 1994, by Pub. L.
No. 103-322, §330016(l)(H), substituting "under this title" for "not more than $1,000."
46. POOLE & ROSENTHAL, supra note 14.
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points for Supreme Court Justices during the same period.
In these measures, increasing positive scores indicate increasing conservatism,
while increasing negative scores indicate increasing liberalism. Table Three reports,
from Poole and Rosenthal, the House and Senate medians between 1937 and 1999,
presidential ideal points between 1953 and 1999, the midpoints between the House and
Senate, and the midpoints between the Senate and the President. Table Three also
reports the Martin-Quinn Court medians between 1937 and 1999.
There are two problems with these measures. First, we are interested in observing
strategic behavior by the Court, or by actors anticipating strategic behavior by the
Court. Ideally we would like to have some measure of Court ideology which is itself
untainted by possible strategic behavior by either set of actors.48 Because the Martin-
Quinn scores are based on actual votes in decided cases, the same problem described
earlier arises: the selection of cases resolved by the Supreme Court itself could be
influenced by the composition of Congress. There is an alternative measure of Court
ideology, namely the Segal-Cover ideological scores, which are calculated from
editorial coverage prior to a Justice's confirmation to the Supreme Court.49 Some
argue, however, that these scores also are inappropriate for computing the Court
median over time, because Justices' ideological preferences change over time.50 It may
be impossible to develop a measure of Supreme Court ideology that sidesteps both of
these difficulties. We run our tests using both of these measures, and find commonality
of results. To conserve space we report only the results obtained from the Martin-
Quinn scores; the results obtained from the Segal-Cover scores are available from the
authors.
The second problem with these measures is that while the political branches are
measured in the same ideological space, the Court is measured only in its own
ideological space.5' That is, the measures of the ideology of the political branches will
accurately capture the movement of those branches over time relative to each other.
However, the measure of Court ideology will capture the movement of the Court over
time only relative to itself.
Because we are interested in measuring the ideological "distance" between the
Court and Congress, this is an important issue. Even though we only need to measure
"relative" distance, and not "actual" distance, we must be certain we correctly place
47. Andrew D. Martin & Kevin M. Quinn, Dynamic Ideal Point Estimation via Markov
Chain Monte Carlo for the U.S. Supreme Court, 1953-1999, 10 POL. ANALYSIS 134 (2002).
48. We note that this is much less of a concern for the congressional ideology scores.
Enacting Congresses know that their legislation may be reviewed by all future courts, not just
the present sitting Court. It is obviously difficult for enacting Congresses to anticipate the
ideological composition of all future Courts.
49. Jeffrey A. Segal & Albert D. Cover, Ideological Values and the Votes of US. Supreme
Court Justices, 83 AM. POL. Sci. REv. 557, 562-63 (1989).
50. Lee Epstein and Carol Mershon, Measuring Political Preferences, 40 AM. J. POL. SCI.
261, 281-84 (1996).
51. But see Michael Bailey & Kelly H. Chang, Comparing Presidents, Senators, and
Justices: Interinstitutional Preference Estimation, 17 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 477 (2001). Bailey and
Chang estimate a common ideological space for the President, Senate, and Supreme Court.




the Court to the right or left of Congress at any given moment. For example, the
scaling of the Martin-Quinn scores places the Court to the right of the Poole-Rosenthal
House/Senate midpoints between 1987 and 1999. If we were confident that the
Congress lay to the left of the Court during this entire period, then we could use these
scores unaltered and simply measure the relative movement of the branches towards
and away from each other over time. (Again, this is because we are only interested in
measuring relative distance, not actual distance. It is change over time that is
significant to us.) However, if at some point the Congress "jumped" to the right of the
Court, then increasing conservatism by the Congress after that point would move the
Congress away from the Court, not towards it. Similarly, increasing liberalism by the
Court would indicate movement away from rather than towards the newly conservative
Congress.
We use two different tactics to deal with this issue, which result in three different
measures of Court ideology based on the Martin-Quinn scores.5 2 The first tactic is to
observe where the Court and the Congress are during the period with which we are
concerned, in relation to their long term ideological distributions. Between 1987 and
1994, the Congress is at the moderate to very liberal end of its long-term distribution.
House/Senate midpoints between 1987 and 1994 are exceeded in liberalness only by
the extremely liberal Congresses of 1937 to 1938, 1965 to 1966, and 1975 to 1978.
During the same years, the Court, on the other hand, is clearly located at the very
conservative end of its long-term distribution. At no other period in time do Court
medians consistently exceed in conservatism the medians during this period, although
they are in the same range for 1949 to 1952, 1971 to 1973, and 1983 to 1986. Prior to
the 1994 congressional elections, then, it is relatively straightforward to assume that
the Court is located to the right of Congress. Because the Martin-Quinn ideological
scores are scaled such that the Court is already located to the right of the Congress
during this period, we can use the unaltered Martin-Quinn scores to capture the relative
movement of the Court and Congress toward and away from each other.
After the 1994 congressional elections-our primary focus-matters are slightly
more complicated. Between 1994 and 1999, the Congress is moderately to very
conservative. The 104th Congress's midpoint is exceeded in conservatism only by the
Congresses of 1947 to 1948 and 1953 to 1954, that of the 105th Congress is not
exceeded by any other Congress, and that of the 106th Congress is exceeded only by
the Congress of 1947 to 1948. The Court, on the other hand, while still conservative, is
somewhat more moderately conservative. It is possible, then, that the Congress is
located either to the right or to the left of the Court for the post-1994 Congresses. We
therefore allow for two possibilities. To allow for the possibility that the Congress
remains to the left of the Court after the 1994 elections, we use the unaltered Martin-
Quinn scores for the entire period of 1987 to 1999. To allow for the possibility that the
Congress shifts to the right of the Court after the 1994 elections, we rescale the Martin-
Quinn medians so that the post-1994 Congresses lie to the right of the Court. Table
Four reports the original (Court 1), as well as the rescaled Martin-Quinn medians
(Court 2). Our first tactic for dealing with the issue of a common ideological space
thus yields two different measures of Court ideology.
52. We also transformed the Segal-Cover scores using the same three scaling techniques;
results are available from the authors.
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The second tactic we take to address this issue of common ideological space is to
note that Supreme Court Justices who are appointed by Presidents and confirmed by
Senators will presumably, over the long run, share the same ideological space as
members of those two institutions. When the Supreme Court is at the center of its long
run distribution, in other words, there is presumably some sense in which this is
comparable to the center of the long run distribution of the President/Senate midpoints.
Similarly, the variance around those means must presumably also be comparable.
Building on the intuition that over the long run these series must occupy the same
ideological space, given the institutional mechanism of the appointment process, we
rescale the distribution of the Court medians to the same mean and variance of the
distribution of the midpoints between the Senate and the Presidency. This technique
preserves the movement of the Court over time relative to itself, as estimated by
Martin and Quinn, but places the Court in the same ideological space as the political
branches. The rescaled Court medians (Court 3) are reported in Table Four. This
measure of Court ideology differs from the previous two in that the Court is to the
right of the Congress prior to the 1994 elections, just to the left of the Congress for the
1995 term, moves back to the right of Congress for the 1996 term, is to the left of the
Congress after the 1996 elections (in which the Senate moves to the right), and moves
back to the right of Congress after the 1998 elections.
In the subsequent analyses we use the three versions of the Martin-Quinn medians
as alternative measures of Court ideology in any given term, and the midpoints
between the House and the Senate as a measure of congressional ideology in any given
Congress. Again, while the scaling differs for each measure of Court ideology, this is
not an important issue because we are interested in the relative movements of the
Court and Congress. The measures differ significantly only with respect to the
positioning of the Congress and the Court after the 1994 elections. As we shall see,
even these differences across the measures do not matter because of the magnitude of
the ideological jump made by Congress after the 1994 congressional elections.
C. The Tests
For each of our three pairs of Court/Congress ideological scores we measure the
ideological "distance" between the Court and the enacting Congress, and between the
Court and the sitting Congress. We follow each statute enacted from 1987 to 1999. In
every year each statute is associated with a measure of the ideological distance
between the (time invariant) enacting Congress and the (time-varying) Court whose
October Term begins in that year. Each statute in any given year is also associated with
a time-varying measure of the distance between the ideology of the Court whose
October Term begins in that year, and the ideology of the Congress sitting as of the
January subsequent to that October. We use this latter convention to allow for the
impact of early November election results on the Court's decisions throughout its term.
This is particularly important when there are large changes as the result of a
congressional election (e.g., the 1994 congressional elections), of which the Court is
surely likely to be aware as of the second week in November. This also makes sense
because the vast majority of Court decisions come out in the second half of the Term.
Table Five reports the measures of ideological distance between the enacting
Congresses and the Court during this period, while Table Six reports the measures of
distance between the sitting Congresses and the Court. As is readily apparent from
both tables, while the three different measures of Court ideology generate different
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orderings of the ideological distances between the Court and Congress, all the
orderings in both tables are dominated by the large jump in the magnitudes of the
distances after the 1994 congressional elections.
IV. ANALYSIS
53
Table Seven reports the summary statistics for all struck statutes compared to all
unstruck statutes. As can be seen in Table Seven, none of the three measures of the
ideological distance between the enacting Congresses and the Supreme Court appear to
be related to the probability that the Court overturns a congressional statute. For all
three measures, the differences between the mean ideological distances for statutes that
are struck and statutes that are not struck are so small as not to be distinguishable from
random variation. Our data thus do not provide any support for the hypothesis that the
ideological distance between the enacting Congress and sitting Court affects the
likelihood that a statute will be struck down. Of course, this does not mean that the
hypothesis is not true, but rather that we find no evidence for it in these specific data.
On the other hand, all three measures of the ideological distance between the sitting
Congresses and the Supreme Court demonstrate clear and strong relationships with the
probability that the Court overturns a congressional statute. For all three measures, the
mean ideological distance between the Court and the sitting Congress is significantly
smaller for statutes that are struck than for statutes that are not struck. The probability
that these differences in means are not due to random variation is at least ninety-five
percent in all three cases. In other words, it appears to be very clear from these data
that the Court is significantly more likely to overturn congressional statutes when it
faces an ideologically congenial Congress.
54
We can get a sense of the magnitude of the Court's responsiveness to the sitting
Congress by looking at these data from another angle. The average frequency with
which a congressional statute was overturned by the Rehnquist Court prior to the 1994
elections was .0002. The average frequency with which the Court overturned a
congressional statute after the 1994 congressional elections was .0009, an increase of
450 percent. It is true that the frequency of overturning congressional statutes is
extremely low in either event, but that is common knowledge. What matters is the
significant increase in frequency when the Supreme Court faces a friendly Congress.
This difference is distinguishable from random variation with a probability of.98. The
change in congressional ideology as a result of the 1994 elections appears to have had
an enormous impact, both substantively and statistically, on the likelihood that the
Court would overturn congressional statutes.
53. A fuller event history analysis of these data, which controls for any temporal dependence
in the data and which permits interaction between the two measures of ideological distance, may
be found in the authors' working paper, Court/Congress Strategic Interaction in Constitutional
Cases: A Statute-Based Analysis (unpublished manuscript on file with authors, Mar. 15, 2003).
54. We obtained qualitatively similar results using the measures based on the Segal-Cover
scores and subsequent rescalings of those scores.
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V. CONCLUSION
Given the Supreme Court's continuing conservative activism,55 we can expect a
constant stream of criticism about the Court and its ideological direction. In light of the
Court's willingness to strike congressional statutes, we also can expect that scholars
will suggest Congress take some action to constrain the Court. But should we expect
Congress to respond?
Our data suggest that the answer to this will depend heavily on who is sitting in
Congress. Indeed, if the data do support our hypothesis, as they seem to, it may mean
Congress is not likely to do anything. What we find is that the Supreme Court is more
likely to strike congressional statutes when it is facing a friendly Congress. If this is
true, what may be necessary to obtain greater deference to Congress by the Court is to
elect a Congress opposed ideologically to the Supreme Court. In other words, the
Court does defer to Congress, we believe, but it is more probably the sitting Congress
rather than the enacting one. The sitting Congress has ample tools to discipline the
Court, should Congress truly believe this is necessary.56 But our hypothesis is that
Congress will not need to do anything in this situation. The very fact of its existence
will, we suggest, cause the Supreme Court to act with greater caution toward
congressional statutes.
55. Editorial, The Court's Troubling Term, N.Y. TIMES, July 3, 2002, at A22 ("In decision
after decision this term, the Court, often by a 5-to-4 majority, pushed the law rightward.").
56. We do not purport to touch at all upon the normative questions regarding the






Congress Years Number of Number of years Number of
public laws laws are observations
enacted followed
100 1987-i988 713 13 9269
101 1989-1990 650 11 7150
102 1991-1992 590 9 5310
103 1993-1994 465 7 3255
104 1995-1996 333 5 1665
105 1997-1998 394 3 1182
106 1999 170 1 170
Total 1987-1999 3315 1-13 28001
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TABLE 2
Struck Congressional Statutes, 1987-1999
Statute (Name and Pub. Year No. of Name of Case Date Oct.Enacted/ EnactingL. No.) Amended Congress Striking Statute Decided Term
Indian Gaming
Regulatory Act/Act of Seminole Tribe 27-M&-
Oct. 17, 1988 (Pub. L. 1988 100 of Florida v. 96 1995
100-497, § 11 (d)(7)) Florida96
102 Stat. 2475, 25 USC §
2710(d)(7)
Act of June 19, 1934, ch.
652, 48 Stat. 1088, § 316, Greater New
18 USC § 1304 (§ 316 of Orleans I4-Jun-
the Communications Act 1988 100 Broadcasting 99 1998
of 1934) as amended in Association v.
1988 (Pub. L. 100-625, § United States
3(a)(4))
Act of Nov. 18, 1988
(Pub. L. 100-690) Sable
102 Stat. 4502, 47 USC § 1988 100 Communications 23-Jun- 1988
223(b)(1) (amendment to of California v. 89
Communications Act of FCC
1934)
Flag Protection Act/Act
of Oct. 28, 1989 (Pub. L. United States v. 1-Jn-
101-131) 1989 101 Eichman 90 1989
103 Stat. 777, 18 USC §
700
Ethics Reform Act of
1989/Act of Nov. 30, United States v.
1989 (Pub. L. 10 1-194) National 22-Feb-
103 Stat. 1716, 5 USC 1989 101 Treasury 95 1994
App. § 501(b) Employees
(Amendment to Ethics in Union
Government Act of 1978)
Gun-Free School Zones
Act of 1990/Act of Nov.
29, 1990 (Pub. L. 101- United States v. 26-Apr- 1994
647) 1990 101 Lopez 95
104 Stat. 4844, 4856,





Act of 1991 (§476, which
became Section 27A of Plaut v.
the Securities Exchange 1991 102 Spendthrift 18-Apr- 1994
Act of 1934)/Act of Dec. Farm, Inc. 95
19, 1991 (Pub. L. 102-
242, § 476)





Competition Act of Educational TV 28-Jun-
1992/Act of Oct. 5, 1992 1992 102 Consortium v. 96 1995
(Pub. L. 102-385, §§ FCC
10(b) and 10(c))
47 USC § 5320) and §
531 respectively
Criminal forfeiture
provision of the Anti-
Drug Abuse Act, as
amended on Oct. 6, 1992 1992 102 United States v. 22-Jun- 1997
(Pub. L. 102-393, § Bajakajian 98
638(e))
106 Stat. 1788, 18 USC
§982
Coal Industry Retiree
Health Benefit Act of
1992/Act of Oct. 24, Eastern 25-Jun-
1992, (Pub. L. 102-486, 1992 102 Enterprises v. 98 1997
Title XIX, § 19143(a)) Apfel
106 Stat. 3037, 26 USC
§§ 9701-9722
Trademark Remedy
Clarification Act/Act of College Savings
Oct. 27, 1992 (Pub. L. Bank v. Florida 23-Jun-
102-542) 1992 102 Prepaid 99 1998
106 Stat. 3567, 15 USC § Education
1122 (Addition to Act of Expense Board
1946)
Patent and Plant Variety
Remedy Clarification Florida Prepaid
Act/Act of Oct. 28, 1992 Education 23-Jun-
(Pub. L. 102-560) 1992 102 Expense Board 99 1998
106 Stat. 4230 (Addition v. College
of subsection to Act of Savings Bank
1952)
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Religious Freedom
Restoration Act/Act of
Nov. 16, 1993 (Pub. L. City of Boeme 25-Jun-
103-141) 1993 103 v. Flores 97 1996
107 Stat. 1488-89, 42
USC §§ 2000bb-2000bb-
4
Interim provisions of the
Brady Handgun Violence
Prevention Act/Act of Printz v. United 27-Jun-




Act/Act of Sept. 13, 1994
(Pub. L. 103-322, § 1994 103 United States v. 15- 1999
40302) Morrison May-00




Decency Act/Act of Feb.
8, 1996, (Pub. L. 104- 1996 104 Reno v. ACLU 26-Jun- 1996
104, Title V, § 502) 97
110 Stat. 56, 133-134, 47
USC §§ 223(a) and
223(d)
Telecommunications Act
of 1996 (also known as
the Communications United States v.
Decency Act of Playboy 22-
1996)/Act of Feb. 8, 1996 1996 104 Entertainment May-00 1999
(Pub. L. 104-104, § 505)
110 Stat. 136, 47 USCA § Group
561 (Amendment to Act
of 1934)
Line Item Veto Act/Act
of Apr. 9, 1996 (Pub. L. Clinton v. New 25-Jun-
104-130, §2(a)) 1996 104 York City 98 1997





Ideological Medians/Ideal Points, 1937-1999
Congress Year House Senate President's House/ President/ Supreme
Median Median Ideal Senate Senate Court
Point Midpoint Midpoint Median
75 1937 -0.146 -0.136
1938 -0.146 -0.136
76 1939 -0.064 -0.066
1940 -0.064 -0.066
77 1941 -0.0685 -0.0795
1942 -0.0685 -0.0795
78 1943 0.0555 0.01
1944 0.0555 0.01
79 1945 0.002 0.019
1946 0.002 0.019
80 1947 0.151 0.133
1948 0.151 0.133
81 1949 -0.028 0.039
1950 -0.028 0.039
82 1951 0.078 0.076
1952 0.078 0.076
83 1953 0.116 0.09
1954 0.116 0.09
84 1955 0.085 0.076
1956 0.085 0.076
85 1957 0.078 0.077
1958 0.078 0.077
86 1959 -0.046 -0.08
1960 -0.046 -0.08
87 1961 0.005 -0.066
1962 0.005 -0.066
88 1963 0.0075 -0.163
1964 0.0075 -0.163
89 1965 -0.135 -0.19
1966 -0.135 -0.19
90 1967 0.017 -0.142
1968 0.017 -0.142
91 1969 0.0135 -0.07
1970 0.0135 -0.07
92 1971 -0.015 -0.0545
1972 -0.015 -0.0545
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Original and Rescaled Court Medians
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TABLE 5























































































































































































































































































































Congress/Court Ideological Distances, Sitting Congresses




100 1987 -0.07475 0.9019312
101 1988 -0.0805 1.012665
1989 -0.0805 0.7976547
102 1990 -0.105 0.8583701
1991 -0.105 0.6632063
103 1992 -0.1075 0.712914
1993 -0.1075 0.692304
104 1994 0.095 0.5779997
1995 0.095 0.5227687
105 1996 0.15 0.6446047
1997 0.15 0.6226252
106 1998 0.12325 0.6522644
1999 0.12325 0.7369668














0.128473 0.4035973 0.2636207 0.3383707
0.1446664 0.2251664 0.3114657 0.3919657
0.1139507 0.1944507 0.2185657 0.2990657
0.1226243 0.2276243 0.2447992 0.3497992
0.0947438 0.1997438 0.1604743 0.2654743
0.1018449 0.2093449 0.1819516 0.2894516
0.0989006 0.2064006 0,1730466 0.2805466
0.0825714 0.0124286 0.1236589 0.Q286589
0.0746812 0.0203188 0.0997951 0.0047951
0.0920864 0.0579136 0.152437 0.002437
0.0889465 0.0610535 0.1429403 0.0070597
0.0931806 0.0300694 0.1557466 0.0324966
0.105281 0.017969 0.1923442 0.0690942
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TABLE 7
Summary Statistics
Mean distance, Mean distance, Probability
Statutes not Struck statutes difference is not
struck (N=18) random
(N=2792 1)
Enacting distance 1 .75 .72 .62
Enacting distance 2 .17 .16 .58
Enacting distance 3 .23 .22 .49
Sitting distance 1 .64 .56 .95
Sitting distance 2 .10 .05 .97
Sitting distance 3 .13 .06 .97
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